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Abstract
Futures contracts on the New York Mercantile Exchange are the most liquid in-
struments for trading crude oil, which is the world’s most actively traded physical
commodity. Under normal market conditions, traders can easily find counterparties for
their trades, resulting in an efficient market with virtually no return predictability. Yet
even this extremely liquid instrument suffers from liquidity shocks that induce periods
of increased volatility and significant return predictability. This paper identifies an im-
portant and recurring cause of these shocks: the accumulation of extreme and opposing
positions by the two main trader classes in the market, namely hedgers and specula-
tors. As positions become extreme, approaching their historical limits, counterparties
for trades become scarce and prices must adjust to induce trade. These liquidity-induced
price adjustments are found to be driven by systematic speculative behavior and are
determined to be significant.
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1. Introduction
Market liquidity refers to the ability to easily buy or sell a security without causing a
significant change in the market price. An essential requirement of liquidity is the ample
availability of counterparties who are willing to sell when others want to buy and who
are willing to buy when others want to sell. Finance theory often assumes perfect market
liquidity where market participants can trade any amount of a security without affecting the
price. This implicitly assumes the unlimited presence of counterparties. This assumption,
while false, is usually a reasonable simplification in large and active markets. There are,
however, occasions where, even in large and active markets, liquidity dries up because of
the scarcity of counterparties. Essentially, these are times when, for the current market
price, everyone who wants to be long is already long, and everyone who wants to be short
is already short. When this occurs, someone wanting to trade will be unable to do so unless
the market price adjusts to induce someone to trade.
This paper presents an empirical analysis of these liquidity-induced price adjustments.
The market chosen for this study is the New York Mercantile Exchange’s light sweet crude
oil futures market. This is the most liquid market for trading crude oil which is itself the
world’s most actively traded physical commodity. Because of its liquidity, this market is
taken to be very efficient, with the market prices reflecting the value of crude oil. As such,
the futures price is used as an international pricing benchmark and an indicator of world
energy prices. Despite this overall liquidity, this paper discovers that there are fairly regular
occasions where price dynamics, as investigated through returns and realized volatility, are
dominated by the low-liquidity effects resulting from the scarcity of counterparties.
Trade in futures markets is dominated by two classes of traders: large speculators and
large hedgers1. In the crude oil futures market, these two classes of traders hold, on aver-
age, 84% of the outstanding futures contracts. While futures markets are anonymous in the
sense that information on who is involved in any given trade is not publicly available, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) provides a weekly snapshot of the hold-
ings of these classes of traders. Under normal market conditions, hedgers and speculators
provide each other with ample counterparties since they tend to take opposing positions, as
indicated by the sample correlation coefficient of their net long positions of −0.96. However,
the number of positions held by these two classes of traders is bounded. Hedgers use fu-
tures contracts to reduce the price risk that they face in their business activities, and so the
number of contracts they hold is determined by the size of their business interests. This, in
1The CFTC requires traders who hold more than 350 futures contracts to report their position and to self-
identify themselves as having commercial or non-commercial reasons for trading. This reporting threshold
varies across time and across different commodities with the aim of capturing between 70 and 90 percent of
the open interest in each market. This paper uses the reporting threshold to identify large traders, and uses
the commercial/noncommercial distinction to identify hedgers and speculators. Details of this data is found
in Section 2.2.
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turn, bounds their positions in the futures market. To use more futures contracts than this
bound would be to over-hedge and would increase the price risk they face2. Speculators are
also constrained by factors such as available capital, trading strategies, as well as leverage
and risk limits. As measured by the aggregate net long positions, the class of speculators
in the crude oil market tend to hold long rather than short positions3. This may be due
to the particular distribution of trading strategies in the market, or it may be due to the
needs of hedgers that require them to offer favorable prices to induce speculators to take
more long positions than they otherwise might.
Under liquid market conditions, hedgers and speculators are not trading near their
limits, and so when a trader wishes to trade, it is highly likely that a counterparty will be
available to trade with. When traders positions begin to approach their historical limits4,
with hedgers going extremely long and speculators going extremely short, the number of
traders willing to go even longer or shorter than they currently are falls dramatically5.
During these times, larger than normal price movements are seen, with the average realized
volatility at its 79th percentile. The notion of directional realized volatility is introduced to
capture the difference in contributions to volatility from periods of positive returns versus
periods of negative returns. Disaggregating the realized volatility in this manner permits
the identification of a significant asymmetry in the cause of high volatility before and after
these liquidity shocks.
Returns and position accumulation are shown to have a strong concurrent relationship
with, in the crude oil market, large speculators tending to increase their long positions
during rising markets while large hedgers tend to increase their short positions. During
falling markets, the opposite is observed with large speculators decreasing their long posi-
tions as hedgers go long. While this relationship holds concurrently, there is no evidence of
predictability of returns from trader positions. However, periods when traders have accumu-
2Some hedgers do intentionally take over-hedged positions in futures markets, which are essentially spec-
ulative positions. This type of behavior reduces the behaviorial distinction between hedgers and speculators,
thereby reducing the effectiveness of the type of analysis performed in this paper. In some markets, like those
for equities and currencies, the fuzziness of the distinction between hedgers and speculators is very signifi-
cant, while in other markets such as those for metals, energy, and agricultural commodities, the distinction
is fairly sharp.
3Speculators appear to favor being long (agreeing to buy future commodities) and hedgers favor being
short (agreeing to sell future commodities) in many futures markets, but there are a few exceptions. For
example, in the cotton futures markets, speculators heavily favor being short, and hedgers favor being long.
4Since the true bounds of positions taken by large hedgers and speculators would be difficult to determine,
historical limits are used as a proxy for this true limit. Since the market has tended to grow over time, true
bounds on position sizes is likely to change. To account for this change, a moving window is used to determine
historical limits. Details of the constriction of this proxy is found in Section 4.
5Note that with speculators strongly tending to be long, it is only when they go extremely short that
liquidity-induced dynamics are seen. In fact, when speculators go extremely long, more speculators enter
the market which improves liquidity. Details of the differences between these two types of events are found
in Section 4.
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lated extreme positions are, because of the concurrent relationship, also periods of markets
trending in one direction. Since extreme trader positions are near their upper or lower
bounds, they inevitably move back towards their average since they cannot become much
more extreme than they currently are. This permits prediction of future trader positions,
and again because of the concurrent relationship between trader positions and returns, this
means that during times of liquidity shocks, returns move in a predictable manner. This
temporary return predictability is verified empirically in Section 5.
Within the literature, the study of liquidity has focused mainly on equity (Hasbrouck and
Sofianos, 1993; Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2001) and fixed income markets (Huang,
Cai, and Song, 2001; Brandt and Kavajecz, 2002). Trader positions have been related to
returns (Sanders et. al., 2004) and volatility (Wang, 2002) in futures markets, however,
this paper extends the methodology of these studies in three important ways. First, the net
position measure is transformed into an index that expresses the current position in relation
to recent maximum and minimum values. This index captures the notion that the positions
that trader classes can achieve are bounded. Second, rather than examining the overall
influence of trader positions, this paper focuses on what happens when the position index
approaches its bounds. Finally, the microstructure of these liquidity shocks are examined
through the entry and exit of large traders in the market. It is found that the number
of hedgers is not significantly changed around times when extreme trader positions are
taken. However, speculators who exit the market because of trading loses or to take profits
are significant factors in the liquidity-induced dynamics around these times. Interestingly,
while these large and sophisticated speculators act in an informed manner during trending
markets before and after these liquidity shocks, the majority are on the wrong side of the
market at the event date.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the market and CFTC data.
Section 3 examines the empirical regularities that differentiate hedgers from speculators.
Section 4 analyzes ex post market dynamics around extreme holdings of these two classes
of traders. Section 5 analyzes these same dynamics ex ante. A brief summary concludes
the paper in Section 6.
2. The Market and CFTC Data
The market under study in this paper is the New York Mercantile Exchange’s Light Sweet
Crude Oil futures market6. This futures contract is the most liquid instrument for trading
crude oil, which is the world’s most actively traded physical commodity. As a result, the
6Detailed information about the crude oil futures market is available from the New York Mercantile
Exchange website at www.nymex.com.
3
futures price of light sweet crude is used as an international pricing benchmark7 and an
indicator of world energy prices. The light sweet variety of crude oil is popular among
refineries because of its low sulfur content and its high yield of gasoline, diesel, and other
petroleum products. This market is chosen because of its high overall liquidity, as well as
the fact that the speculator-hedger distinction is not as fuzzy as in other markets such as
the S&P 500 index futures market where contracts can be used as a speculative and hedging
instrument by the same fund manager.
Data from two sources are integrated for the analysis: futures market trade data8 and
Commitments of Traders Report (CoT) data from the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission (CFTC). The following sections describe these datasets and the construction of the
variables of interest.
2.1. Futures Market Data
Futures price data for the NYMEX light sweet crude oil market is collected for the same
period for which weekly CoT data is available, namely September 30, 1992 until February
28, 2006 (698 weeks). The data is sampled at the tick level (5, 487, 792 observations) and
aggregated to the scales required for variable construction. Since there is trade in several
contracts, each with different expiration dates and market prices, a sensible method of
constructing a single price series over this period is needed. Since the front contract -
the contract with the closest expiration date - usually has the highest trade volume and
open interest, the constructed price series is composed almost entirely of prices from the
front contract. As the front contract approaches expiration, most traders begin to close
out positions in the front contract and enter position in the first-back-month contract. On
the first day that the daily number of price ticks, a proxy for the volume of trade, of the
first-back-month exceeds that of the front contract, the constructed price series uses the
prices from the first-back-month contract from that point onwards.
When the contract providing the ‘market price’ is replaced by another, a price gap is
likely to occur. This price series will give accurate price level information, but price changes
will be skewed by the gaps. To get accurate price change data, the series is ‘back-adjusted’
to remove the gaps. With this back-adjustment, prices are adjusted by determining the
difference between prices on the date of rollover and adding or subtracting the difference
from all previous prices. This will create a series where price levels are actual for the most
recent period but synthetic prior to the date of the last rollover. If this process would create
negative prices at any point in the series, a constant is added to all prices in the series to
ensure that all prices in the series are positive.
7Officially, there are only three crude oil benchmarks: WTI, Brent Blend, and Dubai. WTI, standing for
West Texas Intermediate, is used primarily in the U.S. and is the underlying asset for the NYMEX futures
contracts.
8The data provider for the crude oil futures market tick data is TickData, www.tickdata.com.
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The notion of the return on a futures contract is not clear since the initial value of a
contract is zero. In practice, holders of futures contracts must commit some of their wealth
to a margin account as a ‘performance bond’ to ensure their ability to pay any amounts
owing to their counterparty on a daily basis. At a minimum, the trader must commit the
exchange-mandated margin amounts9 to this account. If any amount less than the futures
price is held in this account, then the futures exchange could issue a ‘margin call,’ requiring
the addition of more funds to the margin account, in the event that the value of the margin
account falls below a specified value. In order to avoid these complications, this analysis
assumes that an amount of cash equal to the futures price is kept in a non-interest paying
margin account10. To get an accurate measure of return, the use of both the unadjusted
price series, Pt, and the back-adjusted series, P bt , are needed. The unadjusted price series
gives accurate price level information while the adjusted series gives accurate price change
information. The return on a futures contract, rt, between times t− 1 and t is defined by
rt =
P bt − P bt−1
Pt−1
. (1)
The returns analyzed in this paper are weekly returns, calculated from prices on the close
of each Tuesday - the ‘as of’ date of the CoT report which is released three days later on
Friday.
In addition to returns, realized volatility (Dacorogna et. al., 2001; Andersen and Boller-
slev, 1998) is analyzed as a measure of the true volatility of this return series. Realized
volatility is sampled on a weekly basis and constructed from 5-minute intraday data. Let
there be h five-minute intervals during which the market is open in one week (currently
h = 270)11. Then realized volatility is calculated as
RVt =
h∑
i=1
(
r
(h)
t−1+i( 1
h
)
)2
(2)
where r(h)t is the five-minute return at time t. Figure 1 presents plots of the unadjusted
price series, the weekly returns, and the realized volatility.
9As of October 24, the initial margin for a contract of 1000 barrels of light sweet crude oil was 5400 USD.
With a futures price of $87.65 per barrel, this minimum margin requirement was only 6% of the value of the
underlying oil at the futures price.
10It is usually possible to keep US Treasury securities instead of cash in a futures margin account, thereby
allowing the margin to earn a risk-free interest rate. The assumption of non-interest paying margin accounts
is made for simplicity and is not significant since we would be interested in returns in excess of a risk-free
rate in either case.
11The current day trading hours for NYMEX crude oil futures is from 10:00 until 14:30 EST. Thus, one
trading day has 54 five-minute intervals, and one trading week has 270 five-minute intervals.
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2.2. CFTC Trader Data
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has been releasing weekly Commit-
ments of Traders Reports12 since September 30, 1992, and at various lower frequencies since
192413. These reports provide a breakdown of the open interest in the American futures
markets as of each Tuesday. Open interest refers to the total number of futures contracts
that have been entered into and not yet exited through a transaction or delivery. Total
open interest is broken down according to the type of trader and by the type of positions
(long or short) that each type of trader holds. There are three types of traders identified by
the CFTC: reporting commercial, reporting non-commercial, and non-reporting. A trader
is classified as a reporting trader if they hold positions in excess of a threshold14 established
by the CFTC on a market-by-market basis. A commercial trader is one who self-identifies as
being “engaged in business activities hedged by use of the futures and options markets.”15
The non-reportable positions are all positions that are held by traders whose total position
size is below the CFTC’s threshold. In what follows, reporting commercial traders are con-
sidered large hedgers, reporting non-commercial traders are considered large speculators,
and non-reporting traders are considered small traders who may be hedging or speculating.
Thus, the disaggregation of open interest performed by the CFTC occurs along three
dimensions: reporting versus non-reporting, hedging versus speculating, and long versus
short (and versus spreads16 for non-commercials). The seven components of the total open
12The Commitments of Traders Reports are published every Friday on the CFTC website at
http://www.cftc.gov/cftc/cftccotreports.htm.
13Early predecessors of the CoT reports were prepared by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Grain
Futures Administration and were released yearly. As of June 30, 1962, CoT data began to be released every
month.
14The current CFTC threshold for the crude oil futures market is 350 contracts. The threshold will vary
across time and markets in an effort to capture between 70 and 90 percent of the open interest in the market.
One of the main reasons for collecting this data is to detect and deter attempts at market manipulation by
large traders. It is illegal to manipulate the price of any commodity in interstate commerce (eg. cornering
a market), and the CoT reporting system allows the CFTC staff to identify large positions that could pose
a threat to orderly trading.
15From CFTC Form 40, Statement of Reporting Trader, page 7. The reliability of these classifications
is not perfect and varies from market to market. There are times when hedgers take speculative positions,
and when speculators hedge their positions. In some markets, such as equity index futures markets, the
reliability is quite questionable, and other, such as the crude oil futures market, where the classification is
expected to be more reliable.
16The spread number in the COT report measures the extent to which a speculator holds equal long and
short positions. For example, if a speculator was long 100 contracts and short 70 contracts, then the spread
number will be 70 and the long number will be 30.
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interest (TOI) that are detailed in the CoT reports are related in the following manner:
reporting︷ ︸︸ ︷
speculators︷ ︸︸ ︷
[SLong + SShort + 2(SSpread)] +
hedgers︷ ︸︸ ︷
[HLong +HShort] +
nonreporting︷ ︸︸ ︷
[NRLong +NRShort]= 2(TOI) (3)
where S, H and NR refer to positions held by large speculators, large hedgers and non-
reporting traders, respectively, with subscripts (long, short, and spread) indicating the type
of positions. On the left side of equation (3), each contract is counted twice since both long
and short positions are counted even though a long and a short position constitute only one
contract. Consequently, the total open interest is doubled on the right side of the equation.
As can be seen from the sample CoT report17 in Figure 2, the report also lists the
number of traders in each category. Note that the sum of the numbers of traders from
each category exceeds the total number of traders due to the fact that a single trader, such
as a spreading speculator, can be counted in more than one category18. Also of note is
that the CoT is available in two versions: a futures-only version, and a futures and options
version that converts options positions into equivalent number of futures positions. Since
the current study is interested in the relationship between trader positions and futures
market dynamics, the futures-only version is used.
Various measures of trader positions are constructed to illuminate the relationships
between trader classes and market dynamics. These measures are defined as they are
introduced in the next three sections.
3. Hedgers and Speculators
The large majority of open interest is held by large hedgers and speculators. In the sample
under study, an average of 84% of open interest is held by large traders that must report
their holdings to the CFTC. Of the reportable holdings, large hedgers dominate the large
speculators by holding, on average, 68% of the total open interest compared with 16% for
the speculators. Equation (2) demonstrates the calculation of the percent of open interest
(POI) held by large speculators. The POI for hedgers19 is calculated similarly, but without
the spread component.
POISt =
SLong,t + SShort,t + 2(SSpread,t)
2(TOIt)
(4)
17See CFTC (2007) for a history of the CoT reports and a full description of CoT variables.
18A trader is counted in each category in which the trader holds a position. For example, a hedger who
is long December 2008 crude oil while also being short June 2009 crude oil will be counted only once for
the number of total traders, but will be counted in both the ‘commercial long’ and the ‘commercial short’
categories.
19POIHt =
HLong,t+HShort,t
2(TOIt)
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where S refers to positions held by large speculators with the subscripts (long, short, and
spread) indicating the type of positions. From the time series of POI presented in Figure
3, the larger size of the positions of hedgers relative to speculators is clear - hedgers hold
between 60% and 80% of the outstanding positions, speculators hold between 5% and 35%
of the outstanding positions, and small traders hold the remaining positions.
Another feature of POI evident in Figure 3 is the inverse relationship between move-
ments in positions of hedgers and speculators. Within the sample, the percent of open
interest held by large speculators and hedgers, POISt and POI
H
t , have a correlation coeffi-
cient of −0.40, indicating that when one trader is entering a position, there is a tendency
for a trader of another class to be closing a position. This observation is consistent with
the proposition that different trader types provide each other with liquidity.
The most popular variable in the analysis of trader positions is the net long measure,
denoted NLCt for trader class C. The net long measures are calculated by
NLSt = SLong,t − SShort,t and NLHt = HLong,t −HShort,t. (5)
Summary sample statistics for the net long positions by trader types are presented in Table
1. The positive mean, median, and skewness of the net long positions of speculators indi-
cates a tendency of speculators to go long, while hedgers tend to go short. This observation
reinforces the proposition that multiple trader types increase market liquidity since if spec-
ulators were not in the market, hedgers would have a harder time finding counterparties
for their short positions. A second observation can be made from the sample kurtosis, both
of which indicate thinner than Gaussian tails. If trader positions are bounded due to some
budgetary or risk constraints, the distribution of their positions would be expected to be
finite or, at most, thin.
As can be seen in Figure 4, the net long position of large hedgers and speculators tend to
move in opposing directions. The strong sample correlation of −0.96 is not unexpected since
a net change for one trader type requires another trader type to take an opposing position.
What is interesting, however, is that the relationship between small traders and large traders
is much weaker, with ρ(NLS , NLsmall) = 0.543 and ρ(NLH , NLsmall) = −0.755. Since the
small trader class is a mix of small speculators and hedgers, the behaviorial regularities
associated with trader classes are weaker, though the signs of the correlations indicate that
a position taken by small traders is more likely a speculation than a hedge.
3.1. Net Long Positions and Market Returns
Before studying at the dynamics induced by traders taking extreme positions, it is useful
to first examine the relationships between the market variables and the entire distribution
of positions. There is a positive concurrent correlation of 0.23 between market returns and
speculative net long positions. Given the strong negative correlation of −0.96 between the
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net long positions of hedgers and those of large speculators, it is not surprising to find a
negative correlation of −0.24 between returns and hedger net long positions. Thus, large
speculators are net buyers in rising markets, while large hedgers are net sellers.
The next step is to consider the lead-lag relationship between positions and returns.
The relevant questions here are ‘Do returns lead trader positions?’ and ‘Do trader positions
lead returns?’ A useful way to begin this analysis is to fit a vector autoregressive model
to the data and performing Wald tests of Granger causality. For the estimation, two two-
dimensional time series
Xt = (x1t, x2t) = (rt, NLSt ) and Zt = (z1t, z2t) = (rt, NL
H
t ) (6)
will be fitted to two separate l-lag vector autoregressive (VAR(l)) models. This is done,
rather than using a single three-dimensional time series, in order to reduce the high levels of
multicollinearity between NLSt and NL
H
t , and because of their highly negative correlation
of −0.97 model misspecification should not be very significant.
The VAR(l) model has the following specification
Xt = ϕ0 +Φ1Xt−1 + · · ·+ΦlXt−l + t (7)
where t is a zero mean white noise bivariate process with a time invariant covariance matrix,
which is equivalent to the following two equation system
rt = ϕ1,0 +Σli=1ϕ1,irt−i +Σ
l
i=1ϕ1,jNL
S
t−j + 1,t (8)
NLSt = ϕ2,0 +Σ
l
i=1ϕ2,irt−i +Σ
l
i=1ϕ2,jNL
S
t−j + 2,t. (9)
The number of lags is chosen by trying several lag lengths and choosing the model
that minimizes the Schwarz-Bayesian information criterion (BIC). For the case of both
Xt = (rt, NLSt ) and Zt = (rt, NL
H
t ) a lag length of 1 is selected. Table 2 contains the
results of the least squares estimation of the VAR(1) model for Xt = (rt, NLSt ). The fit
for the return model is quite poor indicating lack of predictability, whereas the fit for the
NLS model is significantly better with highly significant coefficients for both lagged returns
and positions sizes. These observations can be confirmed with formal tests for Granger
non-causality20. The p-value of the test of the null hypothesis that NLS fails to Granger
cause r is 0.1024, and so the null is not rejected. On the other hand, the p-value of the
test of the null hypothesis that r fails to Granger cause NLS is 0.0016, and so the null is
strongly rejected.
20Granger causality does not imply true causality, but rather implies forecasting ability. A variable y1 is
said to Granger cause y2 provided that y1 is found to be useful in predicting y2; otherwise y1 fails to Granger
cause y2. In the current one lag model, y1 fails to Granger cause y2 provided that the mean square error of
a forecast of y2,t based on y2,t−1 is the same as the mean square error of a forecast of y2,t based on y2,t−1
and y1,t−1. Granger non-causality hypotheses are easily tested using the Wald statistic.
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Given the strong correlation between, NLS and NLH , the least squares estimation of
the VAR(1) model for Zt = (rt, NLHt ) is expected to be similar to those for Xt = (rt, NL
S
t )
given above. Table 3 reports these estimation results. As expected, the null hypothesis that
NLH fails to Granger cause r is not rejected, with a p-value of 0.2424. The p-value of the
test of the null hypothesis that r fails to Granger cause NLH is 0.0175, and so the null is
rejected.
As economic theory suggests, return predictibility should not be easy to find. This has
been confirmed in this section, with a simple VAR(1) model demonstrating no predictive
ability from trader positions. Evidence is found, however, that differentiates the class of
large hedgers from that of large speculators. Speculators are net buyers in rising markets,
and hedgers are net sellers. As will be shown in Section 4.1, this concurrent relationship
between the accumulation of trader positions and market returns will induce return pre-
dictability when positions become extreme and must revert back towards more moderate
levels.
4. Extreme Positions and Market Dynamics - An Ex Post
Analysis
When speculators and hedgers acquire positions that are in extreme opposition to each
other, that is when one group is extremely long while the other is extremely short, the
capacity for these trader groups to continue adding to these positions is limited by the
availability of counterparties. Since speculators tend to take long positions and hedgers tend
to take short positions, there is a particular shortage of counterparties when the positions of
speculators become extremely short and those of hedgers become extremely long. At such
times, speculators who are willing to take long positions have either already taken them or
have left the market, thereby causing the availability of counterparties to fall, and with it,
liquidity dries up. These liquidity shocks are studied in the remainder of the paper.
To study the market dynamics as trader positions approach their bounds, an event study
methodology is used. The first step in this methodology is to define the extreme event that
is being studied. To do this, the notion of trader positions, as expressed by the net long
measure described in the previous section, must be extended to capture the notion that the
positions that trader classes can achieve are bounded. Since the market under study has
been growing over the sample period, an absolute value of the position bounds for all times
is inappropriate. Instead, a local measure, PCt (τ) is employed which uses the maximum and
minimum NLCt values achieved by trader class C within a moving window of τ periods. In
this section, a centered window is used, thereby using information from the recent past and
future. Consequently, in this ex post study, we can study return regularities, but no claim
of predictability can be made from the results. In the next section, an ex ante analysis is
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presented in which only past information is used in the construction of variables, allowing
a discussion of predictability. The advantage of an ex post analysis is that a better proxy
for position bounds is permitted. That is, extreme positions are easier to identify when
future information is used, whereas in the ex ante study, a large position may get labeled
as extreme and then be dwarfed by an even larger position a few periods later. This trader
position measure is expressed as
PCt (τ) =
NLCt −min{NLCt′ }
max{NLCt′ } −min{NLCt′ }
(10)
where t′ ∈ {t− (τ − 1)/2, · · · , t− 1, t, t+ 1, · · · t+ (τ − 1)/2} for an odd-valued τ . In an ex
ante form that is presented in Section 5, using only past information, this variable is similar
to the market sentiment indicator of Briese (1990). For the current study, τ is taken to be
around nine months (39 weeks). Clearly, values of PCt (τ) take values between 0 and 1, with
values achieving 1 when net long positions exceed all values within the nine month centered
moving window. Figure 5 plots this position index for large speculators and hedgers.
The events of interest occur when one trader class is extremely long and the other
class is extremely short. To identify the times of these events, two indicator variables are
constructed. SLHSt identifies times when speculators are extremely long and hedgers are
extremely short, and HLSSt identifies times when speculators are extremely short and
hedgers are extremely long. These variables are defined to be
SLHSt =
{
1 if PSt (τ)− PHt (τ) = max[PSt′ (τ)− PHt′ (τ) : t′ ∈ [t− (τ−1)2 , t+ (τ−1)2 ]]
0 otherwise
(11)
HLSSt =
{
1 if PSt (τ)− PHt (τ) = min[PSt′ (τ)− PHt′ (τ) : t′ ∈ [t− (τ−1)2 , t+ (τ−1)2 ]]
0 otherwise
(12)
An event of type SLHS occurs when the difference between the position indices of specula-
tors and hedgers is larger than that difference at any other time within a centered window
of length τ . For example, if PSt (τ) = 1 and P
H
t (τ) = 0, then speculators are extremely long
and hedgers are extremely short, and so SLHSt = 1 captures the extreme opposition of the
positions of these two classes of traders. Within the sample period there are 20 events of
each type.
4.1. Extreme Positions and Returns
It was shown in Section 3 that a strong concurrent relationship exists between trader po-
sitions and market returns. With rising markets, speculators tend to be net buyers and
hedgers tend to be net sellers. With falling markets, speculators tend to be net sellers
and hedgers tend to be net buyers. This relationship implies that extreme events are of-
ten preceded by periods of trending prices. Once trader positions are near their upper or
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lower bounds, they inevitably move back towards their average since they cannot become
much more extreme than they currently are. When trader positions revert away from their
extremes, the price trend often ends or even reverses.
In the case of SLHS-type events, where speculators are extremely long and hedgers
extremely short, there is a significant increase in prices that begins around seven weeks
before the extreme event resulting, on average, in a 8.8% cumulative abnormal return over
that period, where the abnormal return is defined to be the return minus the sample mean
return of 0.36%. After the event, the upward trend is reversed and prices tend to fall for the
next eight weeks. Thus, SLHS-type events tend to coincide with local price maximums. In
the case ofHLSS-type events, where speculators are extremely short and hedgers extremely
long, there is a significant decrease in prices that begins around six weeks before the extreme
event resulting, on average, in a −9.3% cumulative abnormal return over that period. The
price trend reverses after the event date and tends to rise for the next seven weeks. Thus,
HLSS-type events tend to coincide with local price minimums. Both of these cases are
seen in Figure 6.
To evaluate the effect of trader positions on returns for the week before and after those
positions become extreme, the following model is estimated
rt = α+ β1SLHSt + β2SLHSt−1 + γ1HLSSt + γ2HLSSt−1 + εt (13)
where εt is assumed to be a white noise process, SLHSt is an indicator variable for times
when large speculators are extremely long and large hedgers are extremely short, and
HLSS2 is an indicator variable for times when large speculators are extremely short and
large hedgers are extremely long. The result of this estimation is found in Table 4. All of
the estimated variable coefficients except for γ1 are significant. Since the return, rt, mea-
sures the price change between times t and t− 1, β1 is the change in price leading up to an
SLHS-type event occurring at time t. Similarly, β2 is the change in price that occurs when
the SLHS-event occurred at time t − 1, that is, the change in price after such an event.
Estimates of β1 and β2 are positive and negative, respectively, indicating that prices tend
to rise during the week before an SLHS-type event and fall the following week. Conversely,
estimates of γ1 and γ2 are negative and positive, respectively, indicating that prices tend to
fall during the week before an HLSS-type event and rise the following week. These results
are consistent with the price trends and reversals around extreme events seen in Figure 6.
4.2. Extreme Positions and Realized Volatility
In addition to return regularities, liquidity-induced dynamics should also have an impact on
the size of the returns. To examine this conjecture, this section examines the behavior of the
volatility of market returns, as measured by the realized volatility, around times of extreme
and opposing trader positions. Realized volatilities are sampled weekly and constructed
12
with five-minute returns, as described in Section 2.1. Figure 7 plots the average realized
volatility around the event dates. There is a clear difference between the two classes of
extreme events. The average realized volatility before and immediately after type-SLHS
extreme positions, where speculators are long and hedgers are short, is significantly lower
than the overall sample average21. In contrast, it is significantly higher before and just after
type-HLSS extreme positions, where speculators are short and hedgers are long. In this
case, the average realized volatility on the event date is at the 79th percentile of the entire
sample and is even higher for several weeks before the event date.
To further evaluate the effect of these extreme events on return volatility, the following
model is estimated:
ln(RVt) = α+ β ln(RVt−1) + γHLSS∗t + εt (14)
where RVt is the realized volatility described in Section 2.1, HLSS∗t is an indicator variable
for whether aHLSS-type extreme event occurs within the next five weeks, and εt is assumed
to be a white noise process. This new indicator is defined more formally as
HLSS∗t =
{
1 if HLSSt ∨HLSSt+1 ∨HLSSt+2 ∨HLSSt+3 ∨HLSSt+4 ∨HLSSt+5
0 otherwise.
(15)
The results of this estimation are found in Table 5. The estimated coefficient of HLSS∗t
indicates that a 6.6% increase in the realized volatility is expected in each of the five weeks
before the event date, indicating that HLSS-type extreme events can be economically
important causes of high-volatility periods.
Realized volatility is a measure of the size of price movements, but it says nothing of the
direction of those movements. Yet, the ups and downs of prices might not equally contribute
to the return volatility in any given period. During a swiftly rising market, one might expect
that the numerous buyers would make selling easy, but buying may be difficult in the sense
that it would induce significant slippage. Similarly, during a market crash, selling would
be difficult, but buying would be easy. To investigate the notion that liquidity shocks may
be asymmetric in this sense, the concept of directional realized volatility is introduced.
Directional realized volatility disaggregates the realized volatility into a component that
measures the contribution of positive returns to the realized volatility, denoted DRV Pt , and
another component that measures the contribution of negative returns, denoted DRV Nt .
The two components, which are additive variance-preserving transformations of realized
volatility, are defined as follows:
DRV Pt =
h∑
i=1
[
I
(
r
(h)
t−1+i(1/h) ≥ 0
)
· r(h)t−1+i(1/h)
]2
(16)
21For Figure 7 and the following estimations, a single outlier realized volatility value was removed from
the series. The outlier was on 24 March 1998 and was over 19 standard deviations away from the sample
mean. There was no large price adjustment on that week, so the value was replaced with an average of the
preceding and following values.
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DRV Nt =
h∑
i=1
[
I
(
r
(h)
t−1+i(1/h) < 0
)
· r(h)t−1+i(1/h)
]2
(17)
where r(h)t−1+i(1/h) is the five-minute return as defined in Section 2.1 and I(·) is an indicator
function taking the value 1 if the condition in the brackets is satisfied, and 0 otherwise. The
positive (negative) directional realized volatility sums the squared five-minute returns that
are positive (negative).
Figure 8 plots the average positive and negative directional realized volatilities for the
weeks around HLSS-type events, when hedgers are extremely long and speculators ex-
tremely short. It is clear that the realized volatilities before and after the event date are
composed of two nonsymmetric components. Before the event, the majority of the volatility
comes from negative returns as is seen from the increase in DRV Nt before the event date in
Figure 8(a). After the event date, DRV Nt falls sharply, but DRV
P
t , in Figure 8(b), peaks
thereby keeping the overall realized volatility higher than average. This asymmetric compo-
sition of return volatility indicates that potential ill-effects of liquidity shocks do not affect
all market participants equally. High negative directional volatility would be bad for sell-
ers, while high positive directional volatility would be bad for buyers. Further, a significant
difference between the negative and positive volatilities indicates a trending prices.
4.3. Extreme Positions and the Number of Traders
So far, little has been said of the composition of the groups of large hedgers and speculators.
The Commitments of Traders Reports list the number of large traders in each of these
groups, thereby allowing an analysis of their composition around the times that they acquire
extreme positions. For the class of SLHS-type events, where speculators are extremely
short and hedgers extremely long, the left panel of Figure 9 shows that, on average, traders
are entering the market before the event date and then leave the market afterwards. The
right panel shows that traders are leaving the market before and slightly after an HLSS-
type event, and then quickly begin entering again, raising the number of traders back to
its pre-event level. This observation partially explains why low volatility is associated with
SLHS-type events, and high volatility is associated with HLSS-type events. The number
of traders in a market has long been viewed as a proxy for liquidity since fewer traders
reduces the availability of counterparties. In other words, when there are many traders in a
market, the wide distribution opinions, hedging requirements, available capital, and other
factors means that finding someone who wants to take the opposite position that you want
is highly likely.
Two questions arise from the observation that traders leave or enter the market before
and after extreme positions are taken: Who is it that is leaving the market, and why are
they leaving? A partial answer to the first question is seen in Figure 10 which shows that
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the strong majority of the traders that systematically leave and enter the the market are
speculators, and not hedgers. The fact that hedgers do not enter or exit the market in a
regular fashion around these extreme position events is due to the fact that their positions
are not dependent on the profitability of their trades, but are rather determined by their
business interests.
The number of speculators can be further disaggregated into the number of speculators
who are long and the number that are short. Figure 11 shows these numbers, thereby
giving a fuller answer to the question of who is leaving the market and why they are
leaving. The right panel of the figure indicates that virtually all of the traders that are
leaving the market before the HLSS-type events are speculators that were long. Recalling
the relationship between positions and returns seen in Figure 6, these traders were long in
a falling market, so it is likely that they were leaving the market to avoid further loses.
At the same time leading up to the event date, the number of speculators that are short
is actually increasing. These traders who are selling short in a falling market are realizing
significant profits, and immediately after the event date they begin to take their profits by
closing their short positions. This is seen in Figure 11 where the number of speculators
who are short after the HLSS-type event dates steadily falls. Also after the event date,
the traders who were long and had left the market begin to re-enter the market establishing
new long positions. Thus, there seems to be regularities in the entry and exit of traders
around the event dates that are consistent with speculative profit-taking and with capital
constraints forcing traders to exit losing trades. A similar argument can be made to explain
the regularities around SLHS-type events in the left panel of Figure 11.
Figure 11 can also explain the difference between the volatility levels around SLHS and
HLSS-type events. In both cases, while the changes in the number of speculators who are
short moves in opposition to the changes in the number of speculators who are long, the
magnitude of the later changes are more than twice as large. Thus, the movements in and
out of the market by the speculators who are long dominate the overall change in the number
of traders in the market. Around HLSS-type events, the number of long speculators is low
thereby causing the overall number of traders to be low. This, in turn, reduces liquidity
and causes an increase in volatility. In contrast, around SLHS-type events, the number of
long speculators increases thereby increasing the overall number of traders. Here liquidity
increases and volatility falls.
To check whether these regularities in the entry and exit of speculators plays a role in
the microstructure of returns and volatilities, the following model is estimated,
rt = α+ β1 4 T speclong,t + β2 4 T specshort,t + εt (18)
where 4T speclong,t is the change since the previous period in the number of speculators who are
long, 4T specshort,t is the change in the number of speculators who are short, and εt is a white
noise process. The estimation results in Table 6 indicate that an increase in the number of
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long speculators is associated with a significantly higher return.
The effect of the change in the number of speculators on realized volatility is analyzed
via the following model,
RVt = α+ βRVt−1 + δ1 4 T speclong,t + δ2 4 T specshort,t + εt (19)
The estimation results in Table 7 indicate that increasing the number of long speculators
decreases the expected realized volatility. In the estimation of models (18) and (19), it is
the change in the number of speculators that are long which are significant. The estimated
coefficient of 4T specshort,t has the expected sign, with more short speculators associated with
lower returns and lower volatility, but they are not significant.
4.4. Informed and Uninformed Traders
If a speculative trader were aware of the date of a significant reversal of price movements,
then they would take positions that would profit from this price action. An informed
trader22 would therefore want to be long on a HLSS-event date and short on a SLHS-
event date. However, these events are essentially defined as times when large speculators
are on the wrong side of the market. On average, at SLHS-event dates, only 36% of large
speculators are short, and only 38% are long on HLSS-event dates. Thus, an essential
feature of these liquidity shocks is that a significant number of traders be uninformed of
their timing.
Figure 11 does show that many speculators act informed with respect to the price trends
both before and after the event dates. The longer the trend has been in effect, the more
speculators trade in that direction. However, some traders enter the trend too late as is
indicated by the spike at time zero. Since only aggregate trader numbers are reported in
the CoT reports, it is impossible to tell when a specific trader both enters and exits the
market. Consequently, the distribution of profits within a class of traders is unknown.
With the majority of large speculators being on the wrong side of the market at SLHS
and HLSS-event dates, some conclusions about uninformed traders can be drawn. First,
it would be inappropriate to model these uninformed traders as being equally likely to take
long or short positions, since that would imply that on average the majority of speculators
would be on the right side of the market. Second, uninformed trade appears to be dependent
on past trades since they appear to want to follow a trend that is about to end. Finally,
there appears to be degrees to which a trader is informed with traders entering a trend
throughout its duration.
22Since a hedger’s trading behavior is determined by business interests and risk management strategies,
their actions would be independent of knowledge of these event dates. In this sense, hedgers act as if they
are uninformed traders.
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5. Extreme Positions and Returns - An Ex Ante Analysis
In the previous section, future information was employed in determining what was to be
called an extreme event. As a result, while return regularities were identified, nothing could
be said of return predictability. In this section, the dynamics of returns are examined around
extreme events, similar to the analysis on Section 4.2, however only past information will
be used to identify extreme trader positions.
Backward looking windows of six months (26 weeks) were used to construct position
indices for both speculators and hedgers. As in Section 4, if the difference between the
speculator index and the hedger index is at a six month maximum, then an SLHS-type
event is said to have occurred. In this case, speculators are extremely long and hedgers
extremely short. To identify times when speculators are extremely short and hedgers are
extremely long, an HLSS-type event is said to have occurred if the difference in position
indices is a six month minimum. Without the use of future information, it is impossible to
know that a current maximum will not be exceeded in the next period. Despite this, Table
8 indicates that even without future information, both SLHS-type and HLSS-type events
are significant as both explanatory and predictive variables.
As with the ex post case, this predictability is cause by the mean reversion of trader
positions away from their extremes. In the ex post analysis, mean reversion was a certainty
after an extreme event. In the ex ante case, mean reversion is not certain, but the probability
that the net positions will revert towards their means exceeds the probability that they
will become even more extreme. For speculators, their net positions revert towards their
mean within four weeks following an extreme event 83% of the time23. For hedgers, mean
reversion occurs within four weeks 77% of the time. With this expected mean reversion
and the established concurrent relationship between trader positions and returns, return
predictability is possible.
Figure 12 plots the averaged abnormal return for this ex ante case. Both SLHS and
HLSS-type events do not significantly influence the average cumulative mean returns until
five weeks after the event dates.
6. Conclusions
This paper has shown that extreme trader positions do indeed cause liquidity shocks, even
in otherwise liquid markets. The fact that high volatility is associated with increased return
23This percentage is calculated from the formula
1
40
[∑
t
I
[
NLSt −NLSt+4 > 0
]
· I [SLHSt] +
∑
t
I
[
NLSt −NLSt+4 < 0
]
· I [HLSSt]
]
since there are 40 extreme events in the entire sample.
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predictability in equity markets has been demonstrated by LeBaron (1992). This paper has
found the same regularity in futures markets, and has further identified the underlying
mechanism that induces some of this regularity. As speculators and hedgers accumulate
extreme and opposing positions, the availability of counterparties falls inducing a fall in
liquidity. However, differences in the behavior of speculators in rising versus falling markets
leads to increased volatility only when speculators are extremely net short. Since returns
and position accumulation are shown to have a strong concurrent relationship, when extreme
trader positions move back towards their average as they inevitably do, returns move in a
predictable manner.
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Trader Class Min Max Median Mean Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis
Speculators −71, 928 88, 712 8, 361 8, 471 30, 544 0.06207 2.777
Hedgers −103, 854 94, 868 −8, 103 −7, 804 39, 144 −0.05284 2.617
Table 1: Summary Sample Statistics for the Net Long Measure of Position Holdings for Large Hedgers and
Speculators. Statistics are calculated from 698 weekly observations from September 30, 1992 until February 28, 2006,
as reported in the CFTC Commitments of Traders Reports.
rt = ϕ0 + ϕ1rt−1 + ϕ2NLSt−1 + 1,t
Intercept rt−1 NLSt−1
Coefficients 341.77 −0.05 0.06
Std Error 18.47 0.04 0.04
t-stat 18.49 −1.32 1.63
p-value 0.0000 0.1848 0.1029
R
2
= 0.0024
NLSt = β0 + β1rt−1 + β2NL
S
t−1 + 2,t
Intercept rt−1 NLSt−1
Coefficients 97.71 0.09 0.63
Std Error 14.20 0.03 0.03
t-stat 6.88 3.15 21.46
p-value 0.0000 0.0017 0.0000
R
2
= 0.4262
Table 2: Results of Fitted VAR(1) Model for Returns and Positions of Speculators. Statistics are calculated from
698 weekly observations from September 30, 1992 until February 28, 2006. Trader positions are reported in the CFTC
Commitments of Traders Reports and the weekly returns are calculated from tick-level price data from TickData,
www.tickdata.com.
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rt = ϕ0 + ϕ1rt−1 + ϕ2NLHt−1 + 1,t
Intercept rt−1 NLHt−1
Coefficients 377.32 −0.05 −0.04
Std Error 21.70 0.04 0.04
t-stat 17.38 −1.20 −1.17
p-value 0.0000 0.2290 0.2428
R
2
= 0.0006
NLHt = β0 + β1rt−1 + β2NL
H
t−1 + 1,t
Intercept rt−1 NLHt−1
Coefficients 157.82 −0.07 0.62
Std Error 17.01 0.03 0.03
t-stat 9.28 −2.38 20.78
p-value 0.0000 0.0177 0.0000
R
2
= 0.4012
Table 3: Results of Fitted VAR(1) Model for Returns and Positions of Hedgers. Statistics are calculated from 698
weekly observations from September 30, 1992 until February 28, 2006. Trader positions are reported in the CFTC
Commitments of Traders Reports and the weekly returns are calculated from tick-level price data from TickData,
www.tickdata.com.
rt = α+ β1SLHSt + β2SLHSt−1 + γ1HLSSt + γ2HLSSt−1 + εt
Intercept SLHSt SLHSt−1 HLSSt HLSSt−1
Coefficient 0.000 0.019 −0.031 −0.018 0.024
Std Error 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.012 0.011
t-stat 0.095 2.530 −4.331 −1.465 2.130
p-value 0.924 0.012 0.000 0.143 0.034
R2 0.025
Table 4: Regression Model of the Effect of Current and Past Extreme Trader Positions on Weekly Returns. The
variable SLHSt is an indicator variable for times when large speculators are extremely long and large hedgers are
extremely short, and similarly HLSSt is an indicator variable for times when large speculators are extremely short
and large hedgers are extremely long. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and p-values are reported. The
error term is assumed to be from a white noise process. Statistics are calculated from 698 weekly observations from
September 30, 1992 until February 28, 2006. Trader positions are reported in the CFTC Commitments of Traders
Reports and the weekly returns are calculated from tick-level price data from TickData, www.tickdata.com.
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ln(RVt) = α+ β ln(RVt−1) + γHLSS∗t + εt
Intercept ln(RVt−1) HLSS∗t
Coefficient −2.254 0.629 0.066
Std Error 0.712 0.116 0.027
t-stat −3.167 5.434 2.464
p-value 0.002 0.000 0.014
R2 0.465
Table 5: Regression Model of the Effect of Extreme Trader Positions on Weekly Realized Volatility. RVt is the
realized volatility described in Section 2.1, HLSS∗t is an indicator variable for whether a HLSS-type event occurs
within the next five weeks, and εt is assumed to be a white noise process. HLSSt-type events occur when large
speculators are extremely short and large hedgers are extremely long. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and
p-values are reported. The error term is assumed to be from a white noise process. Statistics are calculated from 698
weekly observations from September 30, 1992 until February 28, 2006. Trader positions are reported in the CFTC
Commitments of Traders Reports and the weekly returns are calculated from tick-level price data from TickData,
www.tickdata.com.
rt = α+ β1 4 T speclong,t + β2 4 T specshort,t + εt
Intercept 4T speclong,t 4T specshort,t
Coefficient 0.000 0.003 −0.001
Std Error 0.002 0.000 0.000
t-stat −0.080 10.771 −1.524
p-value 0.937 0.000 0.128
R2 0.173
Table 6: Regression Model of the Effect of Changes in the Number of Speculators on Weekly Returns. The variable
4T spec
short,t
is the change in the number of speculators who are short, and 4T spec
long,t
is the change in the number of
speculators who are long. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and p-values are reported. The error term is
assumed to be from a white noise process. Statistics are calculated from 698 weekly observations from September 30,
1992 until February 28, 2006. Trader positions are reported in the CFTC Commitments of Traders Reports and the
weekly returns are calculated from tick-level price data from TickData, www.tickdata.com.
23
100 ·RVt = α+ β · 100 ·RVt−1 + δ1 4 T speclong,t + δ2 4 T specshort,t + εt
Intercept 100 ·RVt−1 4T speclong 4T specshort
Coefficient 0.147 0.430 −0.002 −0.003
Std Error 0.030 0.124 0.001 0.002
t-stat 4.910 3.467 −2.107 −1.450
p-value 0.000 0.001 0.036 0.147
R2 0.195
Table 7: Regression Model of the Effect of Changes in the Number of Speculators on Weekly Realized Volatility.
The variable 4T spec
short,t
is the change in the number of speculators who are short, and 4T spec
long,t
is the change in
the number of speculators who are long. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and p-values are reported. The
error term is assumed to be from a white noise process. Statistics are calculated from 698 weekly observations from
September 30, 1992 until February 28, 2006. Trader positions are reported in the CFTC Commitments of Traders
Reports and the weekly returns are calculated from tick-level price data from TickData, www.tickdata.com.
rt = α+ β1SLHSt + β2SLHSt−1 + γ1HLSSt + γ2HLSSt−1 + εt
Intercept SLHSt SLHSt−1 HLSSt HLSSt−1
Coefficient 0.001 0.039 −0.022 −0.039 0.018
Std Error 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.006
t-stat 0.248 8.899 −4.388 −6.318 2.926
p-value 0.804 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004
R2 0.107
Table 8: Regression Model of the Effect of Current and Past Extreme Trader Positions on Weekly Returns Using
Only Past Information. The variable SLHSt is an indicator variable for times when large speculators are extremely
long and large hedgers are extremely short, and similarly HLSSt is an indicator variable for times when large
speculators are extremely short and large hedgers are extremely long. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and
p-values are reported. The error term is assumed to be from a white noise process. Statistics are calculated from 698
weekly observations from September 30, 1992 until February 28, 2006. Trader positions are reported in the CFTC
Commitments of Traders Reports and the weekly returns are calculated from tick-level price data from TickData,
www.tickdata.com.
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Figure 1: Weekly Prices (top frame), Returns (middle frame), and Realized Volatility (bottom frame) for NYMEX
Light Sweet Crude Oil Futures. Prices are the closing price on each Tuesday. Returns are based on an unleveraged
investment of the value of the underlying commodity at the futures price of the previous Tuesday. Realized volatility
is also sampled each Tuesday, and is constructed by summing the squared five-minute returns over the previous
week. The sample period is from September 30, 1992 to February 28, 2006 with 698 observations. Source: TickData,
www.tickdata.com.
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Figure 2: Example of a CFTC Commitments of Traders (CoT) Report. Released every Friday, the CoT report
summarizes the positions of various classes of traders as of the previous Tuesday. The commercial class refers to
large hedgers, and the non-commercial class refers to large speculators. Non-reportable positions are those held
by small traders. The Commitments of Traders Reports are published every Friday on the CFTC website at
http://www.cftc.gov/cftc/cftccotreports.htm.
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Figure 3: Percent of Open Interest for Large Hedgers and Speculators. Information is from 698 weekly observations
from September 30, 1992 until February 28, 2006. Trader positions are reported in the CFTC Commitments of Traders
Reports.
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Figure 4: Net Long Positions of Large Hedgers and Speculators. The net long positions are the number of
long positions minus the number of short positions within the trader class. Values are calculated from 698 weekly
observations from September 30, 1992 until February 28, 2006, as reported in the CFTC Commitments of Traders
Reports.
28
Figure 5: Trader Position Index, PCt (τ), for Hedgers and Speculators with τ = 39 Weeks. The position index is a
measure of how long a trader class relative to the maximum and minimum net long positions of that class over the
centered window of length τ weeks. A value of 1 indicates that a new τ -period net long maximum has been reached.
A value of 0 indicates that a new τ -period net long minimum (a net short maximum) has been reached. The upper
panel is the position index for large hedgers, and the lower panel is the position index for large speculators. Values are
calculated from 698 weekly observations from September 30, 1992 until February 28, 2006, as reported in the CFTC
Commitments of Traders Reports.
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Figure 6: Averaged Cumulative Abnormal Returns. Returns are assumed to have a constant mean. Time relative
to the event date, measured in weeks, are on the horizontal axis. Events at time zero (indicated by a vertical dotted
line) are extreme opposing positions by large hedgers and speculators. When speculators are long and hedgers are
short (solid line), the event date coincides with a local price top. When speculators are short and hedgers long, the
event date coincides with a local price bottom. Statistics are calculated from 698 weekly observations from September
30, 1992 until February 28, 2006. Within the sample period, there are 20 extreme events of each type for a total of 40
extreme events. Trader positions are reported in the CFTC Commitments of Traders Reports and the weekly returns
are calculated from tick-level price data from TickData, www.tickdata.com.
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Figure 7: Average Realized Volatility Around Type SLHS-Type Event Dates and Type HLSS-Type Event Dates.
SLHS-type events are when speculators are extremely long and hedgers extremely short. HLSS-type events are when
speculators are extremely short and hedgers extremely long. The dashed lines are a smoothed versions of the average
realized volatility computed by using a method of running medians known as 4(3RSR)2H with twicing. The dotted
horizontal line is the average realized volatility over the entire sample. Times relative to the event date, measured in
weeks, are on the horizontal axis from 10 weeks before traders take an extreme position until 10 weeks after. Statistics
are calculated from 698 weekly observations from September 30, 1992 until February 28, 2006. Trader positions are
reported in the CFTC Commitments of Traders Reports and the weekly returns are calculated from tick-level price
data from TickData, www.tickdata.com.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 8: Average Directional Realized Volatility Around Type HLSS-Type Event Dates. HLSS-type events are
when speculators are extremely short and hedgers extremely long. Panel (a) plots the average negative directional
realized volatility, and panel (b) plots the positive directional realized volatility. The dashed lines are a smoothed
versions of the average realized volatility computed by using a method of running medians known as 4(3RSR)2H with
twicing. The dotted horizontal lines in the respective panels are the average negative and positive directional realized
volatility over the entire sample. Times relative to the event date, measured in weeks, are on the horizontal axis from
10 weeks before traders take an extreme position until 10 weeks after. Note that the spike in panel (a) at time -1
week is spurious and is caused by a single large value. Statistics are calculated from 698 weekly observations from
September 30, 1992 until February 28, 2006. Trader positions are reported in the CFTC Commitments of Traders
Reports and the weekly returns are calculated from tick-level price data from TickData, www.tickdata.com.
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Figure 9: Averaged Cumulative Change in the Number of Large Traders Around Dates when Speculators and
Hedgers Have Extreme and Opposing Positions. SLHS-type events are when speculators are extremely long and
hedgers extremely short. HLSS-type events are when speculators are extremely short and hedgers extremely long.
The dashed line is a smoothed version of the series, computed by using a method of running medians known as
4(3RSR)2H with twicing. Times relative to the event date, measured in weeks, are on the horizontal axis from 10
weeks before traders take an extreme position until 10 weeks after. The left panel shows that traders are entering the
market before an SLHS-type event, and then leave the market afterwards. The right panel shows that traders are
leaving the market before and slightly after an HLSS-type event, and then begin entering again. The statistics are
calculated from 698 weekly observations from September 30, 1992 until February 28, 2006. The number of traders in
the market is reported in the CFTC Commitments of Traders Reports.
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Figure 10: Averaged Cumulative Change in the Number of Speculators and Hedgers Around Dates when Specula-
tors and Hedgers have Extreme and Opposing Positions. SLHS-type events are when speculators are extremely long
and hedgers extremely short. HLSS-type events are when speculators are extremely short and hedgers extremely
long. The solid and dashed lines represent the cumulative change in the number of speculators and hedgers, respec-
tively. Times relative to the event date, measured in weeks, are on the horizontal axis from 10 weeks before traders
take an extreme position until 10 weeks after. The left panel shows that traders are entering the market before an
SLHS-type event, and then leave the market afterwards. The right panel shows that traders are leaving the market
before and slightly after an HLSS-type event, and then begin entering again. The statistics are calculated from
698 weekly observations from September 30, 1992 until February 28, 2006. The number of traders in the market is
reported in the CFTC Commitments of Traders Reports.
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Figure 11: Averaged Cumulative Change in the Number of Speculators Around Dates Where Hedgers are Extremely
Long and Speculators Extremely Short, disaggregated into to speculators who are long and speculators who are short.
SLHS-type events are when speculators are extremely long and hedgers extremely short. HLSS-type events are when
speculators are extremely short and hedgers extremely long. The solid and dashed lines represent the cumulative
change in the number of speculators that are long and that are short, respectively. Times relative to the event date,
measured in weeks, are on the horizontal axis from 10 weeks before traders take an extreme position until 10 weeks
after. The dotted vertical line indicates the event time. The averaged cumulative change in the total number of large
hedgers. The statistics are calculated from 698 weekly observations from September 30, 1992 until February 28, 2006.
The number of traders in the market is reported in the CFTC Commitments of Traders Reports.
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Figure 12: Averaged Cumulative Abnormal Return Using Only Future Information. Returns are assumed to
have a constant mean. Time relative to the event date, measured in weeks, are on the horizontal axis. Events
at time zero (indicated by a vertical dotted line) are extreme opposing positions by large hedgers and speculators.
When speculators are long and hedgers are short (solid line), the event date coincides with a local price top. When
speculators are short and hedgers long, the event date coincides with a local price bottom. Statistics are calculated
from 698 weekly observations from September 30, 1992 until February 28, 2006. Trader positions are reported in
the CFTC Commitments of Traders Reports and the weekly returns are calculated from tick-level price data from
TickData, www.tickdata.com.
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